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I. INTRODUCTION
The discussion of this paper will be based on the 
following set of propositions on the relationship between 
science and technology:
1. Science has become a principal innovative force 
for the development of new technology; this recent 
and central role of science will almost surely 
continue.
2. The innovative role of science for military 
technology became particularly evident during 
World War II and has continued at an accelerated 
pace during the post-war years.
3. There is increasing concern among the developed 
nations of the world about the social impacts
of technology, arising especially from the rapid 
rate of social change brought about by science­
based technology.
4. These trends are particularly troublesome in
the case of military technology, partly because of
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the special characteristics of military activities 
and the inadequacy of control mechanisms for them, 
and partly because of the comparatively low social 
benefits which come from modern military technology, 
compounded by the diversionary effect of allocating 
large expenditures for military research and 
development.
5. Basic scientific research has been increasingly 
supported by the world's programs of military 
and space R&D; this raises the twin dangers of 
a "captive science," beholden to the military 
and, alternatively, of the development of an unduly 
influential scientific-technological elite.
These propositions, if accepted, strongly suggest the 
need for far better analyses of the application of science 
and technology to military affairs and also suggest that 
scientists must give particular and personal attention to this 
problem area. But before considering implications, it will 
be useful to reflect further on the propositions themselves.
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II. REFLECTIONS ON THE PROPOSITIONS
1. Science as a generator of technology. Both science 
and technology have been with mankind for a very long time; 
science since the time of the Greeks and technology for 
many millennia more. Not until the last few hundred years, 
however, has science played a major significant contributing 
role in the development of technology. Indeed, it can be 
argued that in the early days of science, the direction of 
influence was rather from technology toward science. As 
scientific information accumulated and as the study of 
science was systematized and extended, a gradual shift began 
to occur, ultimately leading to the great utilization of 
science for the development of technology which we now 
experience. A distinguished science historian put it this
4way:
...it is difficult to think of any scientific 
discovery made before the nineteenth century which 
radically altered man's diet, his health, his means 
of production, his transportation and communication, 
or even his methods of warfare. Today we are aware 
that the applications of new discoveries about the 
nature of the universe will be tomorrow the source 
of a new fabric, a new military weapon for offense 
or defense, a new means of controlling or preventing 
disease, or of founding an industry. Every major 
corporation in the United States now supports great 
research establishments; and the constant stream 
of new products and devices emphasizes the fecundating 
power of abstract science and its applications in
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altering the world. Yet this aspect of science is
a characteristic of the last one hundred years only.
Not until the middle of the nineteenth century did 
the applications of science begin to make themselves 
felt. Indeed, the organized research laboratory as 
a part of industry is hardly half a century old.
Much of our bewilderment at the world in which we live 
may arise from the novelty of the revolutionary 
century at whose end we stand, and which itself was
* 
altered at its midpoint, about fifty years ago.
* A specific example may be useful here. The central research 
laboratory of one of the largest oil companies of the world 
celebrated its fiftieth birthday only in 1969. This 
laboratory has expanded in this half century to where it now 
employs roughly 2000 scientists and engineers and operates 
at a budget of several scores of million dollars a year.
A particularly lucid analysis of the changing relations
2 
between science and technology was recently given by H. W. Bode. 
Bode argues that the deliberate application of science to 
technology on a broad scale is an even more recent phenomenon 
than implied above becoming important only during World War II. 
He lays particular stress on the very rapid development of 
science-based industries, as for example, the chemical 
industry, the electronics industry and the computer industry.
As Bode notes:
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The science-based industries naturally reflect, 
to some extent, the characteristics we have previously 
ascribed to modern science itself. For example, as 
modern science is becoming interdisciplinary, we may 
expect its applications to be even more interdisciplinary. 
Thus in many technological situations we may need 
substantial teams of scientists and engineers to 
encompass the required skills. As experimental 
procedures in a single science are increasingly likely 
to depend upon a mixture of tools and methods borrowed 
from other sciences, we can expect a corresponding 
hybridization of tools and methods in technology. 
The fact that science frequently takes long steps 
forward nowadays has its counterpart in the fact 
that technological projects are frequently quite*
ambitious.
In sum, although the deliberate application of science
to technology is relatively new, it is already very firmly 
established, and will inescapably deepen and expand. In doing 
so, it will modify both the ways in which technology is 
developed and the specifics of the technologies themselves.
2. Science and the military. Understandably, most 
analyses of the increasing role of science in the military 
start with the development of the atom bomb in 1945. This 
was a remarkable event in the history of military technology 
in that a major new scientific discovery, nuclear fission,, was 
developed into a revolutionary military weapon in the time­
span of a single war. It can be additionally argued that the 
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decade from 1945 to 1955 saw the advent of not one but 
three genuine revolutions in military technology: the atom 
bomb and its follow-on, the fusion bomb; the precision 
guided intercontinental ballistic missile; and breakthrough 
developments in military communications and control.
Science contributed fundamentally to the first of these and 
importantly to the other two, principally through the 
discovery of new solid-state electronic devices of which the 
transistor was the first. Major expenditures for science­
based military technology have continued since these watershed 
days and the central role of new scientific information for the 
development of military,technology is now very generally 
accepted. As a typical illustration, the chilling forecast
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of future directions of warfare entitled, Unless Peace Comes 
carries the subtitle, "A Scientific Forecast of New Weapons," 
and fully half of the articles in the book relate to applications 
of recent science to military weapons or military strategies 
and tactics. We may safely conclude that scientific warfare 
is with us for the indefinite future. (See also Reference 5.)
3. Societal concern with science and technology. The 
developed nations of the world have exhibited a recent and 
rapid increase in concern with the impact of virtually all 
aspects of technology. These relate to the quality of life 
in general and the degrada-tion of the environment in particular, 
the loss of privacy, and the fear of the impact of military
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technology. As a colleague of mine put it:
Too many of these [scientific] processes have 
effects which, though beneficial in many respects, 
often strike the average man as a threat to his 
individual autonomy. Too often science seems to 
be thrusting society as a whole in directions which 
it does not fully understand and which it certainly 
has not chosen.
A similar but more extended analysis of the problem
was given by Eugene Skolnikoff in a study of science, technology 
and foreign policy
... the accretion of scientific knowledge continues 
to put ever more power under man's control, power 
with the potential of acutal destruction of the human 
species or of alteration of the species and the 
environment in ways incommensurate with present values. 
The motivation can also be stated in more modest 
terms: scientific advances often lead to developments
that increase the instability of power. Or, more 
precisely: the unpredictability of scientific advance
implies that it is always a potentially destabilizing 
factor in international relations. The possibility of 
sudden developments that would make a new weapons 
system feasible, such as an effective missile defense 
or a discovery that reduces the cost and complexity 
of powerful weapons, thereby making them available to smaller 
countries, are cases in point.
It is a platitude to observe that it is not 
science itself that is destabilizing and it is not 
science that is the direct agent for evil. It is, 
instead, man's technological application of scientific
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knowledge that should be the focus of attention. But 
the layman has the right to ask not only whether 
technology can be controlled but also whether the 
underlying science that made the technology possible 
can be controlled.
Widespread as these concerns are for all kinds of 
technology and for the role of science in>generating technology, 
there are ample reasons why the concerns should be particularly 
sharp for military technology. A first point is that although 
military technology has an ancient and honorable history of 
application to civilian problems, in this recent period of
*
science-based military technology the civilian utility of 
these efforts has become so much smaller that expenditures 
for military technology constitute very largely a diversion 
of funds and technical manpower from civilian efforts. In 
substantial measure this shift in position relates to the very 
great increase in the sophistication and specialized character 
of military technology which the application of science 
has itself brought about. There remains substantial controversy 
over the precise amount of "civilian spin-off" from military 
and space research and development. It is evident that there 
is some spin-off, as witness the civilian jet aircraft which 
followed from the military aircraft developments of the 
1940's and 1950's. But specialization has limited such spin-off, 
and a generous estimate is that perhaps as much as 20 percent 
of military and space R&D has significant civilian utility.
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A different sort of measure of the degree to which the 
development of military technology competes with civilian- 
oriented efforts is the amount of involvement of trained 
manpower. Some indication of the magnitude of this is 
the estimate that about 40 percent of the world’s research 
and development efforts have, in recent years, gone into
* *
military R&D.
** This very approximate estimate can be roughly justified. 
Military and space R&D in the U.S. is now about 43 percent 
of the nation's total, although for the decade from 1957 to 
1967 the fraction has been greater than one-half. For the 
U.S.S.R., most estimates of this fraction are well above 50 
percent, ranging up to one estimate from the U.S. Pentagon 
of 80 percent. If one lumps the U.S. and U.S.S.R. together 
and estimates that half their total R&D is for military and 
space, an estimate of 40 percent of the total for the entire 
world seems reasonable. (Figures for the U.S. from National 
Science Foundation report, "National Patterns of R&D Resources 
Funds and Manpower in the United States, 1953-70." For an 
analysis of Soviet expenditures for military research, see 
SIPRI Yearbook, 1969/70, page 288.)
A crucial reason to be concerned about the role of 
science in the military is the open-ended character of the 
demands of the military for new science-based technology.
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The concept "national security" turns out in normal practice 
to be given an almost entirely military interpretation. And 
the system of checks and balances which is normally employed 
to establish social priorities in governmental expenditure 
levels turns out to work particularly poorly in the case 
of military spending. A recent analysis by a United States 
Congressman, doubtless speaking from personal experience, put 
the difficulty in the following words:1
The pressures from within the Pentagon for increased 
expenditures are enormous. They stem in part from 
traditional and still acute competition among the 
military services. In part, they are the natural 
result of increasing technologies; each new generation 
of weapons means greater complexity and sophistication, 
and the expense seems to rise by geometric rather than 
arithmetic progression... The existence of a new 
technology seems to compel a new weapons system based 
on that technology; some of my ablest colleagues in 
the Congress believe that this process is inevitable 
with respect to MIRV, for example, and cannot be 
arrested by arms-limitation agreements or in any other 
way.
To the experts in the Pentagon, the fear of what 
the other side may be doing is ever present. It is 
natural for the military man to try to achieve absolute 
security against any contingency that may arise, even 
though intellectually he may recognize that absolute 
security is unattainable, he is trained and paid to 
think this way. Thus, the military services will 
always and inevitably want more than they have. Their 
appetites are insatiable. And the industrial concerns 
that are ready and eager to undertake the required 
contracts will encourage them...
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The real trouble comes when those civilians in 
government who are supposed to see to it that the 
military's appetite is restrained are not capable of 
performing that function because they have come to 
share the military point of view.
Further difficulties arise when one attempts to obtain 
adequate technology assessment of military problems in 
circles outside of the direct supporters and proponents of 
the military. A serious difficulty for the lay public is the 
sophisticated and generally unfamiliar character of military 
technology. It is difficult enough to ask an intelligent 
layman for a thoughtful'judgment on the environmental hazards 
of the SST; it is of almost an order of magnitude greater 
difficulty to get an informed lay judgment on the technical 
utility or cost effectiveness of a complex military system 
such as an antiballistic missile system.
Another difficulty results from the fact that most 
military technology is developed in secret. Even in com­
paratively "open" societies like the U.S. and Britain, this 
greatly increases the problem of adequate civilian assessment. 
Consider, for example, the military technology of most recent 
political concern — multiple independently targeted warheads, 
MIRV. The first public reference indicating U.S. interest 
in this system was made by Defense Secretary McNamara in a 
wide-ranging Life Magazine article in late 1967. This date, 
however, was sufficiently far down the road of the MIRV 
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developmental effort that a decision to deploy was only months 
away. Clearly the time and information required for an 
adequate civilian assessment of MIRV had been precluded by 
the blanket of secrecy which had covered its development.
What is the position of the scientist in all this?
Scientists of many countries have become increasingly involved 
in disarmament studies, in analyses of national and inter­
national security, and in studies of the role of science 
in the development of military technology. At the same time, 
it must be noted that the number of scientists whose research 
is supported by the military and space establishments has 
grown greatly since the start of World War II in almost all 
of the nations of the world. It is sobering to recall the 
prescient words of President Eisenhower in his 1961 Farewell 
Address. After giving his famous warning against undue 
influence from the military-industrial complex, Eisenhower 
went on to say:
Akin to and largely responsible for the sweeping 
changes in our industrial-military posture has been 
the technological revolution during recent decades. 
In this revolution research has become central; it 
also becomes more .formalized, complex, and costly. A 
steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at 
the direction of the Federal Government.
Today the solitary inventor, tinkering in his 
shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists 
in laboratories and testing fields. In the same 
fashion the free university, historically the fountain­
head of free ideas and scientific discovery, has 
experienced a revolution in the conduct of research.
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Partly because of the huge costs involved, a Government
contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual 
curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now 
hundreds of new electronic computers.
The prospect of domination of the Nation’s scholars
by Federal employment, project allocations, and the 
power of money is ever present and is gravely to be 
regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery 
in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the 
equal and opposite danger that public policy could 
itself become the captive of a scientific and 
technological elite.
Faced with this kind of concern, scientists have often 
argued that science itself is neutral and that the only 
problem is to control the technology for which science merely 
opens the door. But in view of massive governmental support 
for science, this is disingenuous to say the least. If 
we are to be concerned with military technology and with 
the role of science in generating it, then we cannot fail 
to be concerned with the character of the support for science 
itself.and the uses to which science is being put.
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III. RESPONSES
Supposing we accept as fact that science has become 
a major driving force for all technology and notably so 
for military technology, and further that adequate assess­
ment and control of technology is particularly difficult 
in the case of the military. Suppose we note further the 
world-wide tendency to give the phrases "national" and 
"international security" a military or quasi-military 
interpretation. What responses are indicated?
As a preliminary point, the very magnitude and gravity 
of the military problem puts it in a class by itself. We 
are concerned with an effort which leads to expenditures 
of §200 billion per year world-wide, expenditures which in 
very large measure constitute a diversion of badly needed 
funds away from alleviation of the major social problems 
which face the world. We note further that military R&D 
puts particularly large demands on the skilled manpower of 
the world, including notably the scientists and engineers. 
Finally, we note that all of this occurs in the face of 
the evident fact that the appalling destructiveness of 
nuclear weapons makes .it evident that major wars can no 
longer be "won."
If we are to respond in sufficiently effective ways 
to counter the very considerable momentum of the military 
and of science-based military technology, we must operate 
simultaneously at several levels.
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1. There must be much greater analysis, understanding 
and response from the citizens of the world.
2. Governmental bodies including national governments 
and the United Nations, must assume responsibility 
for more intensive analyses of national and inter­
national security and for the development of 
mechanisms which disseminate widely the results
of these studies.
3. The world's scholars and most notably the scientists 
and engineers must assume a much more active role
in these analyses, giving particular attention to the 
implications of their own studies in contributing 
to the military momentum.
4. International, non-governmental meetings for
4
study and exchange of views can help overcome
the sometimes xenophobic national security analyses 
which make international agreements so difficult 
to obtain.
If the general public is to play a positive role in
these analyses and in the decision making processes, a 
critical need is for more dissemination of information about 
the military, about national and international security, 
and about the particular problems of military technology. 
Difficulties arising from secrecy and from the specialized 
character of military systems requires an effort which goes
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far beyond the normal news dissemination activities. A 
landmark in the development of major information efforts 
on military problems was the campaign within the United 
States which arose in response to the proposed deployment 
of an ABM system. A consequence of the steady flow of 
articles, letters, speeches and books was that for the 
first time in the United States a broad segment of the 
general public was fairly well informed of the problems 
which would accompany the deployment of this particular 
military system. The continuing question then is, how 
can one develop procedures which will insure that similar 
public information efforts will accompany further devel­
opments of military technology? The U.N. has an important 
role here; its activities of analysis and communication 
on military problems should be greatly expanded. So 
also, should the efforts of national and international 
peace study societies and foreign policy analysis groups. 
It is, for example, a real tragedy for the United States 
that peace studies efforts are fragmented into so many 
small, often barely viable, groups.
These public information efforts must be supplemented 
by greatly expanded scholarly efforts to understand the 
problems of national and international security. These 
studies must give much greater stress than the military 
and their supporters are willing to give to the funda­
mentally new dimensions of warfare and security which
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have been brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons 
and ICBMs. As one key question, for how long should we 
be content to have as a principal element of national 
security a reliance on nuclear deterrence, the implications 
of which are that in response to a military attack from an 
enemy country, we will respond by destroying some tens of 
millions of innocent civilians who dwell in our opponents’ 
cities? What kind of world are we building if this sort 
of response is to be considered rational?
A principal center and focus for the efforts of study 
and communication should be within governments. Here in 
particular is the place where the concept "national security" 
must be examined in a much broader context than that of 
the military. The dominance in decision making on security 
problems of Defense Ministries or of Congressional Arms 
Services Committees must be shattered. A small but hearten­
ing sign in the United States is the development of a 
vigorous informal Congressional group called the Committee 
for Peace Through Law. How much better it would be if such 
committees were formally established and had the 
obligation to place their recommendations alongside 
those which come from Armed Services Committees and 
Committees on Foreign Affairs?
A complicating problem is the suspicion, often bordering 
on xenophobia, which too frequently exists between nations 
and which supports and encourages the one-sided "worst case" 
analyses which too often fuel the military a^msraces. The
•/ .. r ■. ■ ■' a :7• / $ ‘4-;
United Nations should have a role to play in minimizing these 
tendencies but too frequently the United Nations itself is 
paralyzed by the competing national pressures.
Non-governmental international meetings offer an important 
avenue for increased international understanding. The Pugwash 
meetings, for example, made it possible for there to be 
exchanges of views on problems of peace and war between 
Eastern and Western scholars at a time when almost no other 
openings existed. Clearly, ways must be found to greatly 
increase these informal efforts toward international under­
standing.
In all of this, science and scientists have major 
roles which they must assume. In the face of the appallingly 
expensive military efforts and with clear evidence that science 
is a major innovating force for military technology, it simply 
will not do for science and scientists to plead neutrality. 
Science is being diverted into the development of technologies 
which are broadly diversionary and appallingly destructive.
What specifically can scientists do? The first point 
is the development of a greater sense of social responsibility 
for all aspects of the application of science to technology. 
This involves analyses by individual scientists of the 
implications of their own work. It implies educational 
programs to give scientists and engineers a firmer understanding 
of potential impacts of science and technology, as well as 
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explicit practice in participating in the kinds of 
interdisciplinary technology assessments which are increasingly 
needed. The great scientific professional societies, the 
Royal Society and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, 
for example, have an important role here in providing both 
a home for such analyses and a forum for their discussion.
I
Surely there is a place in these societies for more explicit 
programs of discussion of these problems, more sponsorship 
of study group efforts, and more provision of supporting funds 
for such studies.
Scientists also have a major role to play in fostering 
international discussions of these grave problems. Given 
the international character of science it is not surprising 
that the international Pugwash movement was started by 
scientists, brought together from many nations by the 
dreadful prospects of nuclear war. Pugwash has broadened 
greatly from those early days, but the role of scientists 
remains central in all of its programs of study and communi­
cation. But, effective as it is, Pugwash is only a single 
organization of mostly part-time participants. The world 
could use many more such efforts.
Above all, for all of these efforts, we need more 
scientific activists, more people sufficiently persuaded 
that these problems are of such priority that they must 
personally give significant fractions of their time to 
their analysis. It is almost impossible to overestimate 
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the importance to these efforts of a Hans Bethe, a Rudolph 
Peiris, an Igor Tamm, a Wolfgang Panofsky. What we clearly 
need is a nucleation technique which permits key people 
like these to catalyze the development of some scores of 
additional similar scientific activists. I know of now 
better way to underscore the problem and the need than to 
quote from one of these scientific activists, W. K. H.
7
Panofsky:
Our knowledge of science will indeed increase 
continuously: the facts of nature are there to
be explored, and they will not, and should not, 
remain hidden. But the process of going from 
science to military technology involves a 
protracted series of planned steps, including 
development, test, production and deployment.
This chain extends over many years, or even 
decades, and it is up to man to decide through 
his political processes to undertake such 
steps or not to...
I see no valid excuse why we should acquiesce 
in the development of weapons of ever-increasing 
lethality. If we subscribe to the belief that 
technology has a life of its own and that its 
progress in any direction, however antisocial, 
cannot be impeded, then it is indeed true that 
man has lost control over his own destiny.
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